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During 2004 the South African government
announced that in the coming years it would
endeavour to reduce violent crime by seven to ten
per cent per annum. Over the following five years
there was a steep decrease of 25 per cent in the
overall level of violent crime in South Africa as
measured by the total number of incidents of
assault (common assault and assault with intent to
inflict grievous bodily harm), robbery (common
robbery and aggravated robbery), murder and
attempted murder (Table 1).2 The decreases have
been lowest in relation to murder and aggravated
robbery but have been fairly dramatic in relation
to the other four offence categories; varying
between 22 per cent in the case of assault GBH
and 39 per cent in the case of attempted murder.
As a result, during the 2003/04 to 2008/09 period,
the total number of recorded cases has declined by
206 448. Of this decline, 43 per cent is accounted
for by the decline in cases of common assault, and
a further 27 per cent in cases of assault GBH, so
that 70 per cent of the total reduction is accounted
for by different categories of assault. 
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Following an announcement in 2004 by the South African government that in the coming years it would
endeavour to reduce violent crime by seven to ten per cent per annum, total levels of violent crime dropped
by 25 per cent over the next five years. However, a closer look at the crime statistics over this period
reveals a number of peculiarities that require explanation. In recent years there have also been numerous
press reports on the manipulation of crime statistics that have highlighted the existence of incentives
within the SAPS not to record violent crime. This article argues that the identified peculiarities in crime
statistics can be understood as linked to non-recording, which is shaped by a hierarchy of violent crime in
which some categories of crime are viewed as important while others are viewed as unimportant. This
implies that current violent crime statistics cannot be relied on as an indicator of trends in violent crime.    
Table 1: Change in recorded levels of six major
categories of violent crime, 2003-04 to 2008-09
2003/
04
2008/
09
Change
over
five
years
%
change
over
five
years
% of
total
reduct
-ion
Murder 19 824 18 148 -1 676 8,5 0,8
Attempted 
murder 30 076 18 298 -11 778 39,2 5,7
Assault with 
intent to inflict 
grievous 
bodily harm 260 082 203 777 -56 305 21,6 27,3
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 133 658 121 392 -12 266 9,2 5,9
Common 
assault 280 942 192 838 -88 104 31,4 42,7
Common 
robbery 95 551 59 232 -36 319 38 17,6
Total 820 133 613 685 -206 448 25,2 100
Source: SAPS statistics
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PECULIAR FIGURES 
At face value the figures presented in Table 1 are
peculiar for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is
reasonable to assume that there should be some
correlation between trends in attempted murder
and trends in murder. How then to account for
the fact that attempted murder is decreasing at a
rate five times greater than murder? If the
reduction is a result of government efforts to
reduce violent crime, how is it that the SAPS, or
the criminal justice system, or government more
generally, were able to reduce attempted murder
so dramatically, but not murder itself? 
A second peculiarity relates to the comparison
between purported trends in assault GBH and
aggravated robbery, and those of murder. It is
widely acknowledged that there are two principal
drivers of the murder rate. The first includes
various types of disputes which become
increasingly violent and could end in cases of
common assault, assault GBH, or attempted
murder, with the most extreme cases resulting in
murder. The predominance of these types of
murders is confirmed by the latest police research,
which indicates that they account for roughly 64
per cent of murders.3 Aggravated robbery is also
an important driver of murder, although its
contribution to the number of murders is
dramatically smaller than that of dispute-type
murders.4 The statistics presented in Table 1
indicate that there has been an 8,5 per cent
decrease in the number of murders,
notwithstanding the fact that both the key drivers
of murder have decreased by a greater amount. In
particular, assault GBH is decreasing at more than
2,5 times (21,6 per cent) the rate at which the
murder rate is decreasing. How is it that this is not
having a more dramatic impact on murder levels?5
A third peculiarity relates to the trends in
common assault. Along with common robbery,
this is a category of violent crime that usually
escapes scrutiny from people commenting on
crime statistics, as it is understood to represent a
less serious form of violence. 
SAPS statistics on common assault and assault
GBH over the period 1994/95 are reflected in
Figure 1. As can be seen, there is a similarity
between recorded levels of common assault and
assault GBH over this period. From 1994/5 until
2001/02 common assault was recorded at a lower
rate than assault GBH. But common assault
exceeded cases of assault GBH in the 2002/03 year
by some 16 000 cases and in the 2003/04 year by
some 20 000 cases. Though there were decreases
in both categories of assault from 2002/03 to
2003/04, from then onwards both assault GBH
and common assault figures dropped precipitously.
Also, from this point onwards declines in common
assault exceeded those for assault GBH, so that as
from 2006/07, figures for common assault once
again fell below those for assault GBH. One
outcome of this dramatic decline in figures in both
categories is that both the latest SAPS common
assault figure (192 838) and assault GBH figure
(203 777) are the lowest recorded in South Africa
since 1994/95, when the SAPS recorded 200 248
and 215 671 of these cases respectively. Overall the
reduction in common assault since 2003/04 
(31 per cent or 88 104 cases) is far more dramatic
than that recorded for assault GBH (22 per cent or
56 305 cases).
In any society the occurrence of assault can be
understood to have a pyramid-like distribution.
Less severe assaults (that would be recorded as
common assault) occupy the bulk of the pyramid
at the bottom. More serious assaults (that would
be recorded as assault GBH) occupy a band across
the middle with assault-related murders (i.e. the
'dispute type' murders referred to above) at the
top.6
Notwithstanding this pyramid-like distribution, it
is not unusual for fewer incidents of common
assault to be recorded than assault GBH, as was
the case in South Africa up to 2001/02. Due to the
fact that victims often do not regard such cases as
serious enough to report, or do not even identify
them as crime, they are far less likely to report
common assaults than they are to report more
serious assaults.7 However it seems reasonable to
assume that confidence in a police service will
improve as police become more effective and more
approachable, and that this will lead to higher
rates of reporting, including more reporting of
10 Institute for Security Studies
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Police often make the claim that crimes such as
assault are not responsive to policing crime
prevention strategies. If so, it is unlikely that
policing would produce the above effect, and to
do so it would need to be targeted at common
assaults to the exclusion of more serious assaults.
Notwithstanding the claim that assault is not
responsive to policing, it is possible that
enforcement of the Domestic Violence Act has
contributed to the decline in common assaults.
However, SAPS statistics provided in November
2009 to parliament provide no indication that
reports of domestic violence received by the SAPS
are declining. Instead they indicate that the
number of these cases increased by eight per cent
from 2006/07 to 2008/09.9 This includes increases
even in the Northern Cape, the province that has
recorded a 47 per cent decline in reported
common assault in the last five years, the most
dramatic decline among any of the nine
provinces.   
Just as it is unlikely that policing would
disproportionately impact on common assault
there is no reason to believe that any 'crime
prevention effect' of other social interventions on
the part of government (such as improvements in
social grants) would contribute to faster declines
in common assaults than in more serious assaults. 
common assaults. In South Africa such an
improvement in confidence, or at least in
community relationships with police, may
account for the distinct increase in reported levels
of common assault reflected in statistics for the
period from 1996/97 to 2002/03. But considering
that common assault is more under-reported than
assault GBH, why is it that recorded common
assault should drop at a far faster rate than assault
GBH, particularly during a period where it is
claimed that there are improvements in police
service delivery and where there is no evidence of
a dramatic deterioration in police community
relations (despite persistent complaints about the
quality of police services)?8
If the trends reported in the SAPS statistics are an
accurate reflection of reality, the implication is
that for some reason the base of the 'assault
pyramid' (reflected in cases of common assault) is
withering away at a far faster rate than the middle
of the pyramid (cases of assault GBH), which in
turn is withering away at a faster rate than the top
of the pyramid (assault-related murders). If there
were an overall decline in levels of assault it might
be assumed that this would have at least as much
of an impact on serious assault as it does on less
serious assault, rather than the decline being most
concentrated in common assault. 
Figure 1: Trends in recorded Common Assault and Assault GBH in South Africa, 1994-95 to 2008-09 
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Vehicle 
hijacking 13 793 14 201 408 3 3
Cash in 
transit 
heists 192 395 203 106 1
Truck 
hijacking 901 1 245 344 38 2
Bank 
robbery 54 144 90 167 1
Residential 
robbery 9 351 14 481 5 130 55 33
Business 
robbery 3 677 9 862 6 185 168 40
Street 
robbery 105 690 77 984 -27 706 -26 -181
Total 133 658 118 312 -15 346 -11 -100
DISCORDANT TRENDS IN
CATEGORIES OF AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY  
Similar peculiarities are apparent in relation to
robbery. Common robbery has purportedly
declined by 38 per cent, whereas aggravated
robbery10 declined by only 9,2 per cent.11 Just as
peculiar is the radical discrepancy between trends
in street robbery (in which figures have
plummeted) and trends in the other six ‘high
profile’ categories of aggravated robbery (which
have been doing the opposite). As illustrated in
Table 2, apart from street robbery, all categories of
aggravated robbery have increased, most
obviously residential and business robbery. The
nine per cent decline in the number of aggravated
robbery cases reflected in Table 1 is purely
attributable to the fact that the net increase of 
12 360 cases in the six categories is offset by a
decrease of 27 706 cases of street robbery. 
What can be made of this discrepancy? Is it
possible that those involved in street robbery
Table 2: Change in recorded levels of seven sub-
categories of aggravated robbery, 2003-04 to
2008-09 
Record-
ed cases
2003 –
04
Record-
ed cases
2008 –
09
Change
over
five
years
%
change
over
five
years
% of
total
change
in this
category
spontaneously opted to desist from their activities,
with more and more street robbers endorsing this
decision? Or have street robbers decided en masse
to switch to other types of robbery? Or is it that
government efforts to reduce robbery have
miraculously reduced street robbery,
notwithstanding the fact that policing and
business-led crime prevention initiatives give
priority to preventing and tracking down the
culprits involved in the smaller 'high profile six'
categories, particularly the 'trio' crimes of
hijacking, residential and business robbery?12
PRESS REPORTS OF THE
MANIPULATION OF CRIME
STATISTICS  
In recent years there have been persistent reports
in the press about the 'cooking of crime statistics'
by police. In a selection of press articles on the
matter,13 allegations relating to such manipulation
are made in relation to five of South Africa's nine
provinces. In this selection of press articles, eleven
different police stations in the Western Cape, four
stations in Gauteng, one station in KwaZulu-Natal
and one station in Limpopo are alleged to have
manipulated crime statistics. Whilst not referring
to any single police station, a brief press report in
January 2010 also referred to an ICD investigation
that pointed to various 'irregularities' in the SAPS
in the Free State, including the 'manipulation of
crime statistics'. 
One prominent example is the Mountain Rise
police station in Pietermaritzburg. In June 2009
press reports indicated that a SAPS inspector at the
station had been suspended after alleging that
statistics at the station were being manipulated. It
was claimed that police at the station were
instructed not to record criminal complaints
unless the suspects were immediately available or
facts easily ascertainable. Unrecorded dockets were
allegedly kept aside in a separate room and
eventually burnt.14 The practice had become
institutionalised on the instructions of the station
commissioner who had been deployed to the
station early in 2007. The inspector was
subsequently reinstated (and apparently seconded
to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation)
12 Institute for Security Studies
Source: SAPS statistics
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whilst an ICD investigation confirmed the
allegations and culminated in a recommendation
that disciplinary action be taken against the
station commissioner.15
Also in June 2009, the Western Cape MEC for
Safety and Security, Lennit Max, went public with
allegations that at the police stations in Paarl,
Paarl East, Mbekweni, Wellington and
Oudtshoorn, cases were downgraded (i.e. offences
were recorded as less serious than had been
reported) or not recorded at all. Max is reported
to have said that he feared the manipulation of
crime statistics he had so far been notified of was
only a fraction of what had occurred at the
province's 147 police stations. Press reports in
October 2009 also indicated that an SAPS
disciplinary process had found the station
commissioner and others at the Lansdowne police
station guilty of tampering with crime statistics.16
Another press article referred to a leaked internal
report sent to the Western Cape provincial
commissioner in December 2006, indicating that
'quite a substantial number of stations are
involved in manipulation'. The report referred
specifically to the Porterville, Piketberg and Paarl
East police stations. A report in June 2007
referred to such manipulation at the Bishop Lavis
police station, with other reports in 2007 and
2008 referring to similar practices at the Knysna
and Gugulethu police stations.17 Subsequent press
reports appeared to confirm the existence of
evidence of cases systematically not being
recorded at the Knysna police station.18
The non-recording or 'downgrading' of cases of
crime referred to in these press reports is not
specific to cases of violent crime. The press
reports refer to a diversity of cases, including
attempted murder, assault, robbery, rape, fraud,
various forms of theft, and burglary. Some of the
articles dealing with the issue have given
particular prominence to the non-recording of
sexual offences, reflecting how seriously the press
views these cases. Organisations focusing on
sexual offences have also given prominence to the
non-recording of these types of offences. In
August 2009, Joan van Niekerk of Childline told
Parliament's portfolio committee on women and
children that police were turning away 'numerous'
sexual abuses victims, 'telling parents that their
children will be traumatised by the criminal justice
system process, that they can do nothing if the
child is too young to testify'.19
One explanation for the non-recording emerging
from the press reports is that the Police
Performance Chart has provided a perverse
incentive for the practice. The SAPS 'Performance
Chart' is a computerised system linked to the SAPS
Crime Administration System, which ranks stations
according to improvements in their performance as
measured by reductions in crime and increases in
the rate of detection. The Performance Chart
clearly provides an incentive to station
commissioners for the non-recording of cases,
particularly those that are unlikely to be detected.
This is because a reduction in recorded cases
results in a favourable performance rating for any
given police station – but because the Performance
Chart also ranks stations on 'detection rates', there
is a positive motivation to record cases that are
likely to be solved. Members at the winning
stations (i.e. those stations that record the highest
performance rating scores) in each province are
apparently entitled to a performance bonus.20 Both
the Tzaneen and Mountain Rise police stations
were apparently the best performing stations in
their provinces in 2008 as a result of their non-
recording of key categories of crime. 
Non-recording appears to have had a particularly
strong impact on cases of violent crime. One
reason for this is that the Performance Chart gives
particular weight to violent crime cases so that the
incentive not to record these cases is stronger (see
Andrew Faull's article in this edition of SACQ).
However, considering the dramatic way in which
statistics on violent crime have plummeted, and the
fact that this coincides with the period subsequent
to the introduction of the seven to ten per cent
targets in 2004, it seems reasonable to conclude
that these targets have also provided a strong
motivation for non-recording. 
The targets were implemented without due
consideration being given to the possible negative
CQ No. 31 - Mar 2010  3/17/10  3:20 PM  Page 17
implications thereof. Referring to cases of rape,
for instance, one provincial commissioner is
quoted as saying that the target of seven to ten per
cent reduction is 'impossible to achieve – the only
way we can do it is to turn victims away'.21 In
addition to the financial incentives for police
officers not to record crime, reports indicate that
an additional incentive was that station
commanders were placed under direct pressure by
senior SAPS management if their crime statistics
increased, irrespective of evidence of other
improvements in the performance of their police
stations.22 Due to the fact that these were targets
that government had committed to, police
management had a strong motivation to ensure
that they were achieved, for fear of embarrassing
government and incurring the displeasure of
senior politicians. 
The Performance Chart and the seven to ten per
cent targets can therefore be seen to have
provided both 'carrot and stick' motivations to
reduce the recording of crime. The Performance
Chart created internal incentives for stations not
to record crime. Motivators might have included
the possibility of performance bonuses as well as
the concern that if one did not manipulate the
statistics, one's station would have been identified
as 'under-performing'. In relation to the seven to
ten per cent targets it appears that station
commissioners would have been concerned about
incurring the acrimony of senior management.
Senior management was more concerned with
reducing recorded crime than with how this
reduction was achieved.
WHY ARE SOME CATEGORIES OF
VIOLENT CRIME GOING UP?
If one accepts that there are peculiarities in
relation to statistics on violent crime, and that the
system of perverse incentives described may
explain these peculiarities, there nonetheless
remains an anomaly. Notwithstanding the fact
that there were reductions in all of the major
categories of violent crime reflected in Table 1,
notable increases were recorded in six of the seven
sub-categories of aggravated robbery as indicated
in Table 2. How can it be that the system of
perverse incentives highlighted above could be
'selective' in its impact on different categories of
violent crime?
In understanding why this is possible, it is
necessary to recognise that in South Africa there is
a largely unacknowledged hierarchy of violent
crime, which contributes to some categories of
violent crime being regarded as important and
others as unimportant. There are two dynamics
that shape this hierarchy. The first of these is the
seriousness of offences themselves. Thus two of
the three categories23 that have recorded the
highest overall reductions are common assault and
common robbery, categories that (as indicated
above) are widely regarded as less serious. 
The second factor might be described as the
'politics of violent crime'. What this means is that
different victim constituencies, or their advocates,
compete for recognition and attention to be given
to specific types of violent crime. The effect of this
in South Africa, and no doubt in other countries,
is that types of crime that are of concern to the
most powerful and articulate tend to be
considered as most important, and those that
affect less powerful constituencies are by
comparison virtually invisible, and tend to be
neglected in public policy.24
If this is true it is not a coincidence that the forms
of violent crime in which increases have been
recorded, and which probably have been more
reliably recorded, are those forms of violent crime
that most affect businesses and the middle class.
Vehicle hijacking is likely to mostly affect the
middle class, since poor people are less likely to be
vehicle owners, but it is not clear whether this is
also the case for residential robbery. 
Nevertheless, as was the case with hijacking in the
1990s, during the last decade residential robbery
has become prominent because of the apparent
increased targeting of middle class homes. Even
though it may be common in poorer areas, it is
because of its impact on the middle class that it
has come to be seen as a priority crime. Similarly,
business robbery has come to be regarded as a
priority crime because of its impact on the formal
14 Institute for Security Studies
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business sector, though the businesses that are
most vulnerable to robbery may be those in the
informal sector. 
There may be other factors at work here. Upper
middle class victims, who constitute a substantial
proportion of the victims of residential robberies
and car hijackings, are probably more likely to
want proof that the case has been registered for
insurance purposes, and may also be more likely
to make follow-up calls to the police to check on
progress with the case, motivating for their cases
to be recorded.25 However, violent crime cases
with middle class victims are not only more likely
to be recorded, but because these types of crime
impact on businesses or the middle class, they
have come to be seen as more important – and are
likely to be better recorded, even in poorer areas.26
The hierarchy of violent crime is a product of the
combined effect of these two types of dynamics.27
Thus it is the offences that are less important in
terms of this hierarchy, offences that by and large
impact on poorer South Africans, that are most
likely not to be recorded and that have therefore
been declining most precipitously.28
CONCLUSION 
This article has considered a number of
peculiarities in current statistics on violent crime
and argued that these peculiarities make sense
when understood in relation to the 'perverse
incentives' created by the establishment of the
SAPS Performance Chart and pressure from
government for the SAPS to reduce violent crime
by seven to ten per cent per annum. 
The implication is that the non-recording of crime
is widespread within the SAPS and that this non-
recording is responsible for much of the reduction
in violent crime that has been reported in
statistics over recent years. The implication of this,
in turn, is that current crime statistics cannot be
regarded as a reliable indicator of trends in crime,
particularly in violent crime. 
Reports in the press of stations involved in the
manipulation of crime statistics have raised
doubts about the reliability of police crime
statistics. Yet there is still a tendency on the part of
the Ministry of Police to view these stations as
exceptions to the rule.29 In totality these reports
point towards a pervasive pattern of manipulation
of crime statistics, notwithstanding the fact that
the police stations identified above only make up
roughly one per cent of the total number of police
stations.30 It seems reasonable to assume that the
stations identified in the press reports referred to
represent the tip of the iceberg of this
phenomenon, both on the basis of the reports and
because the peculiar patterns in crime statistics can
be explained by the perverse incentives that have
been established to under-record crime. Thus,
rather than being a reflection of the extent of the
problem, the press reports are an indication of the
paucity of whistle blowing. While this is
disappointing it is not necessarily surprising. The
inspector at Mountain Rise, for instance, gave
testimony of how he was victimised at the station
after various attempts to draw attention to the
issue, including the attention of senior SAPS
management and state prosecutors.31
There are specific difficulties and risks related to
the use of crime statistics as a key performance
measure for the police. One difficulty is that levels
of reporting do not purely reflect crime trends, but
also changes in attitudes to the police. If people
have greater confidence in the police they will be
more inclined to report cases to them. A reduction
in crime statistics can only reasonably be used as a
police performance measure in a social
environment where police-community relations
are at an optimal level and can be expected to
remain very stable.
Another obvious drawback is that using crime
statistics as a performance measure creates
perverse incentives. If police are being evaluated
on how many cases they report, they will be
motivated to discourage reporting or otherwise
manipulate the recording process to get the
numbers down. It is therefore only viable to use
crime statistics as a police performance measure in
circumstances where the process of recording
crime itself has a high level of integrity and
reliability.32
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There is therefore obviously a need to establish a
culture of integrity in recording crime statistics in
the SAPS. Whether or not the pending Stats SA
investigation into SAPS crime statistics will
contribute to this objective cannot be known at
this point, but what is clear is that until it is
demonstrated that such a culture has been
established33 there will be serious doubts about the
reliability of official crime statistics, as well as
questions about whether crime statistics and
detection rates should be included as key
indicators in performance measures. 
The issue of crime statistics has been a vexed one
throughout much of the post-1994 period.
Government has often appeared to view these
statistics primarily in terms of the negative image
they might create. Government ministers have
variously tried to restrict their availability, to the
point of imposing a complete moratorium on
their release from July 2000 to May 2001. Crime
has thus in many ways been a matter of image
management for government, rather than an
incentive to develop proper strategies for reducing
crime. The credibility and integrity of SAPS crime
statistics are now casualties of this approach. If
there is one principal lesson that should be drawn
from this, it is that tackling violent crime can no
longer be an issue of image management and
must become the focus of clear strategies that are
properly implemented. 
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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